In a random search environment with two racial groups each composed of identical numbers of high and low productivity workers, …rms use an imperfect screening device (interviews) to control hiring. If inconclusive interviews lead …rms to hire majority workers but not minority workers, then the unemployment pool for majority workers is of higher average quality. This can justify the initial hiring choices. Color-blind hiring always eliminates racial disparities but is not necessarily bene…cial; in the USA it would improve welfare with only a brief small increase in white unemployment.
Introduction
The unemployment rate among white Americans without a high school diploma has historically been around half of that among similarly educated blacks. And, all of the disparity stems from di¤erences in their matching (rather than separation) rates. This paper shows how such an outcome can arise in a search and matching environment with imperfect screening of workers by prospective employers. Essentially, when …rms apply a stricter standard to minority applicants than those from the majority group, fewer low ability minority workers get hired. This makes the average quality of the minority unemployment pool worse than that of the majority. Firms will use the average quality of the pool as a prior as to their applicants' productivity. Imperfect screening means that even after the interview the prior has an e¤ect on the …rm's beliefs about the worker's productivity. This justi…es the stricter standard being applied to minority workers and leads to worse employment outcomes for that group. The model will be calibrated to data from the USA in order to assess its empirical validity and to address policy implications. Holzer and LaLonde [2000] analyze worker ‡ows in the low-skilled labor market in the USA using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort (NLSY79). They …nd that after controlling for observable characteristics whites get jobs much faster than blacks yet their separation rates are not statistically di¤erent from each other. Meanwhile Bowlus and Seitz [2000] structurally estimate a variant of the Burdett and Mortensen [1998] model for the USA using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They …nd that the matching rate for unemployed blacks is much slower than for unemployed whites. To explain measured di¤erences in wages they conclude that there needs to be signi…cant di¤erences in skill levels. 1 The point of their …ndings for the current paper is that race explains matching and skills explain wages. The subsequent analysis abstracts from di¤erences in skill levels to focus on a particular mechanism by which race can a¤ect matching rates.
The continuous time search and matching environment comprises people in two racial groups with similar (low) skills and the same ex ante mix of individual productivities. Each worker's true productivity is his private information. I make a fundamental assumption that makes the environment relevant for the low-skilled workforce: …rms do not know the worker's employment history. If …rms could observe how long a worker has been looking for a job it would provide a clearer view as to the probability that the worker is high productivity. Low-skilled workers, however, move frequently in and out of the workforce (see Holzer and LaLonde [2000] , Krusell et al [2011]) so that even if a …rm could …nd out how long a worker has been jobless, it would not be a strong indicator of how much time he has spent actually looking for work. The idea here is that each …rm uses the composition of the whole unemployment pool of the appropriate racial group for its prior as to an applicant's likelihood of being high productivity.
Controlled by a free-entry condition, …rms in the model create as many individual vacancies as they like. Unemployed workers encounter the vacancies according to a constant returns to scale matching function. To keep the environment simple, I assume a two point productivity distribution which represents the extreme values of the range of worker productivities who will be in the market. Employed high productivity workers produce more than their non-market output while employed low productivity workers' output is equal to that of their non-market activity. The …rm incurs a cost for any worker hired that re ‡ects speci…c training, administrative and equipment expenditures. Because of this, ex ante gains from trade with low productivity workers are negative. The way to view this is that markets are segmented by skill levels and the model considers the market for one particular skill level.
The heterogeneity in productivity here comes from the residual variance in worker output after controlling for skills.
When they meet, the …rm interviews the worker. If the worker is revealed to be of high productivity or if the interview is inconclusive but the unemployment pool is of high enough quality, the worker is hired. In the latter case there remains some asymmetry of information. Wage formation is, assumed to be by take-it-or leave-it o¤er from the …rm. 2 All workers then get a wage equal to the value of their non-market activities. 3 Once hired, the …rm has no incentive to get rid of the worker.
Simulations are provided to illustrate the workings of the model, to draw out further results beyond those that emerge from the algebra, and to explore policy implications. Parameters are chosen to generate outcomes for black and white over 25 year old high school dropouts in the USA. The presumption is that, due initially to historical factors, the unemployment pools across racial groups are su¢ ciently di¤erent that inconclusive interviews mean white workers get hired while black workers do not. In the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium of the model, these choices are rational. The fact that some low productivity white workers have been taken out of their unemployment pool means that …rms hiring applicants with inconclusive interviews can expect to recoup the hiring costs. Meanwhile, as all of the low productivity black workers remain in their unemployment pool, …rms hiring black applicants with inconclusive interviews cannot expect to recoup the hiring costs.
There are three other possible types of equilibrium of the model. There are two types of nondiscriminatory equilibria. In the …rst, the "Lenient" equilibrium, all workers with inconclusive interviews are hired. In the second, the "Strict" equilibrium no workers with inconclusive interviews are hired. The third alternative equilibrium is the "Majority Disadvantaged" equilibrium in which the numerically larger group (i.e. whites) are the ones for whom an inconclusive interview means they do not get hired.
At the parameter values used here, the Strict and Majority Disadvan-2 Giving workers some opportunity to make wage o¤ers (as in Mailath et al [2000] ) leads to a signalling game that has a continuum of equilibria. No standard re…nement can help in this matter (see Masters [2009] ).
3 Although this mechanism for wage formation is made for tractability purposes, it should be clear that, given the narrow range of productivities within the market, the range of possible wages coming from any other mechanism will be narrow too.
taged equilibria do not exist. Thus the model provides an environment which can help to explain why we typically observe that the numerically smaller group is disadvantaged. When the larger group are disadvantaged, discriminatory hiring has a stronger impact on unemployment. Vacancies are contacted by applicants more frequently which tends to make the …rms pickier. But, if the workers to whom they are lenient are su¢ ciently rare, …rms are more inclined to accept workers with inconclusive interviews.
Two criteria for considering the e¢ cacy of policy are considered: wel- Coate and Loury [1993] question the implementability of colorblind hiring. They suggest that outcome-based policies are more feasible.
Further discussion of this issue is found in Section 4.4.
Literature
As the focus of this paper on composition e¤ects that come from hiring decisions, the appropriate modelling environment is one in which the composition of the unemployment pool is endogenous. The search and matching framework is readily adapted for this task and there exists a small literature on its use in understanding discrimination. Their paper is, therefore, more about how the market can di¤erentially encourage skill acquisition while mine is more about the residual di¤erences in unemployment after controlling for skill level.
The possibility of generating discriminatory outcomes by pure composition e¤ects was …rst suggested in Masters [2009] . That model contains no racial groups and its focus was on the welfare e¤ects of changes in interview technology. For some special parameter values multiple equilibria are possible but the extension to a multiracial economy was not pursued. In the current paper, the interview technology and wage formation are simpli…ed to generate a sharper prediction of the wage and make the existence of multiple equilibria more robust. To provide more realism in terms of labor market ‡ows the current paper also endogenizes the matching rates of workers.
Model

Environment
A continuum of workers live in continuous time. A mass one of workers is born per unit of time and longevity for each is exponentially distributed with parameter : The steady state total population of workers is therefore 1= : There are two racial groups. A share of the in ‡ow are in the majority group so that 1 is the population share of the minority. 4 For both groups a share, ; has high productivity (called type h). The remaining 1 of the population have low productivity (type l). A worker's productivity is his private information while his race is not. 5 Workers can be either employed 4 At this point majority and minority are simply labels and, the subsequent analysis does not require that 1 2 : 5 Absent non-contractible choices made by workers (as in Mailath et al [2000] ), incomplete information is essential to generate discriminatory behavior. Firms will use race as a proxy for productivity. If productivity is observable race will play no part in the or unemployed. Workers are risk neutral, discount the future at rate r and, while unemployed, receive a ‡ow utility from non-market activity of b:
There is a continuum of …rms that can create any number of jobs. Firms are risk neutral and discount the future at the rate r: Holding open a vacant job incurs a ‡ow advertising cost to the …rm of k. A worker of type t = h; l matched to a job produces y t units of output per unit time. Hiring a worker incurs a one time cost, c; associated with administrative, equipment and training costs. Firms have access to a testing technology: with probability the …rm observes the true productivity of the worker, with probability 1 she gets no information from the test. Jobs are subject to a catastrophic technology shock at Poisson arrival rate . The terms of trade are determined by a single take-it-or-leave-it wage o¤er from the …rm to the worker. A game theoretic analysis of the wage setting is provided in Lemma 1 of Masters [2009] . There, it is shown that any equilibrium of the screening game implies that for both high and low productivity workers, w = (r + )V u where w is the wage and V u is the worker's value to unemployment. Now if V w is the value to employment at allocation.
6 These conditions rule out corner solutions.
wage w then
where is any matching rate. Setting w = (r + )V w now implies that w = b: Due to the search frictions there is a strictly positive match surplus.
As the …rms get all of the bargaining power, workers are driven down to the monopsony wage. 7 Firms cannot demand a hiring fee from workers.
This restriction is quite common in the search and matching literature (e.g. Millard and Mortensen [1997] , Blanchard and Diamond [1994] ) and is usually justi…ed by the workers being liquidity constrained or by the …rms being unable to commit not to renegotiate wages.
It is also assumed that a worker's employment history is his private information. While, say, the time since the end of a worker's last employment spell should be available to a prospective employer, how much of that time is actually spent looking for work is unobservable. That the whole of the worker's employment history is his private information represents an alternative benchmark to that history being common knowledge. 8 The implication is that …rms cannot use a job applicant's employment history to ascertain his true productivity. Rather, …rms use the current composition of the whole unemployment pool. Again, such an assumption seems more reasonable in a low-skilled labor market where people are known to move in and out of the labor force with some frequency. 9
The parameters satisfy the following restrictions:
This result extends the Diamond Paradox to the case with asymmetric information. 8 Other papers that make this assumption include Akin and Platt [2012] , Masters [2009] and Sattinger [1998] . 9 See Krusell et al [2011] .
Restriction (R1) implies that once hired there are non-negative gains from trade between …rms and both types of worker. The idea is that the market comprises of workers whose productivities lie in the range between b and y h .
I consider the simplest distribution of that type with mass points at y h and b:
Restriction (R1) also means that for low productivity workers, because of the hiring cost, there are no ex ante gains from trade. Restriction (R2) implies that there are expected gains with the in ‡ow population. This means that no matter how bad the interview technology (i.e. even with = 0) there is some incentive to create vacancies in the …rst place.
Equilibrium
De…nition 1 A hiring strategy for a …rm is a mapping from the set of post interview possible beliefs as to the probability that the worker is of high
If the interview is conclusive (that occurs with probability ) the belief as to the worker's productivity is either 0 or 1: If the interview is inconclusive the …rm uses its prior belief as to the worker's productivity which comes from the composition of the unemployment pool for the appropriate group of workers.
De…nition 2 A workforce composition is an allocation of workers by type and group into unemployment and employment.
De…nition 3 An equilibrium is a workforce composition and a hiring strategy for each …rm, such that, given the workforce composition, each …rm follows an optimal hiring strategy and that when all …rms follow their optimal strategy the implied population ‡ows are consistent with the workforce composition.
I seek pure strategy symmetric equilibria. Pure strategy here means that …rms do not randomize over hiring decisions. Symmetry means that all …rms follow the same strategy in equilibrium. This means that any two …rms have the same propensity to hire, say, a minority worker whose interview is inconclusive. It does not prevent di¤erences in their propensity to hire minority workers versus majority workers.
Three types of such equilibria are possible. In a discriminatory equilibrium whenever an interview is inconclusive, members of one group, do not get hired whereas members of the other group will get hired. I will call the group who do not get hired after an inconclusive interview the "disadvantaged"group so that the other group will be called the "advantaged"group.
For a given value of there are potentially two subtypes of discriminatory equilibria. One in which the minority are disadvantaged, henceforth called a "Minority Disadvantaged"equilibrium, and one in which the majority are disadvantaged, henceforth called the "Majority Disadvantaged"equilibrium.
The other two equilibrium types are nondiscriminatory. In a "Lenient"equilibrium, regardless of their racial group, workers with inconclusive interviews get hired and in a "Strict" equilibrium they do not.
Characterization
The objective here is to construct a Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium.
To do so we …rst posit its existence and then obtain any restrictions that specify circumstances under which the equilibrium does exist. That the wage is equal to the ‡ow value of the workers'non-market activity, b; trivializes the worker's side of the economy. Firms, however, have a non-trivial problem to solve. They have to decide how many vacancies to create and whom to hire based on the interviews they conduct. Taking the current population stocks as given, this subsection obtains an implicit expression for the implied level of labor market tightness, ; such that …rms are indi¤erent between creating an additional vacancy and not doing so.
Notationally, superscripts will refer to group membership, g = a; i (majority or minority group respectively) and subscripts will refer to type, t = h; l (high and low). Let V g t be the present discounted value to a …rm who employs a type t worker from group g and let V v be the value to hold-ing open a vacancy. Then, allowing a dot over a variable to denote its time derivative,
where is the share of majority group workers in the unemployment pool and g is the share of group g unemployed workers who are high productivity.
The …rst term in the square brackets says that with probability a the worker is of group a; is high productivity and has a conclusive interview.
So, the …rm experiences the capital gain associated with hiring a group a type h worker. The second term says that with probability (1 ) a the worker is group a; is high productivity but has an inconclusive interview. So, the …rm experiences the capital gain associated with hiring a group a type h worker. The third term says that with probability (1 )(1 a ) the worker is group a; is low productivity and has an inconclusive interview. So, the …rm experiences the capital gain associated with hiring a group a type l worker. The …nal term says that with probability (1 ) i the worker is of group i; type h and has a conclusive interview. So, the …rm experiences the capital gain associated with hiring a group i type h worker. No other types of worker are hired in the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium.
The left-hand-side (lhs) of equation (1) represents the ‡ow value to creating a vacancy adjusted for its rate of change. The right hand side (rhs) is a breakdown of the components that contribute to it. The ratio m( )= is the expected rate at which the vacancy will meet workers. So, predicated on meeting a worker contributions to V v come from the possibility of meeting a majority group worker who tests positive (the …rst term), a majority worker whose test is inconclusive (the second and third terms), and a minority group worker who tests positive (fourth term). From the positive contributions to vacancy holding that come from meeting workers it is then necessary to subtract the ‡ow cost, k; of maintaining the vacancy.
The …rm pays the wage, equal to b; out of the match output. The match is subject to the worker leaving the workforce at rate that leaves the job intact. The job is subject to a catastrophic technology shock at arrival rate that puts the worker back into the unemployment pool. The lhs of equation (2) is the ‡ow value to being matched to a type t worker from group g adjusted for dynamics in V g t : The components of the rhs comprise the ‡ow pro…ts from the match, y t b; the possibility that the worker might die, and the possibility that the job might get destroyed. It should be clear from equation (2) that V a t = V i t for t = h; l so that in the sequel, without ambiguity, I will drop the superscripts from V t .
As …rms can create as many vacancies as they like, they will continue to do so whenever V v > 0: At every instant in time, therefore, we have V v = 0 and equation (1) reduces to
Then from equation (2), as there is no other source of dynamics, 10
This means that although we have not imposed any steady state, the …rms' 
As is common to models with the Pissarides free entry condition, the cost of holding a vacancy is equal to the present expected ‡ow pro…ts from matching. Unlike the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework, however, equation (5) does not imply a constant value for the market tightness, : As ; a ; and i vary over time so will : As V h is a simple combination of the model parameters, for notational brevity the remainder of the analysis will treat it too as a parameter.
Population ‡ows
The values of ; a and i come from consideration of the population ‡ows.
Clearly, the total population, P; is 1= ; and there are always P a = P majority workers and P i = (1 )P minority workers in the workforce.
If u g t and e g t are respectively the measures of unemployed and employed workers from group g = a; i and type t = h; l then for the high productivity majority group workers
The …rst two terms on the right hand side of equation (6) are the ‡ows into unemployment, the last term is the ‡ow out. In the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium, these workers always get hired so does not show up in this equation. Now, e a h can be obtained from subtraction from the total population: e a h = u a h : Low productivity majority group members only get hired when the interview is inconclusive. So, by the same token,
where e a l =
(1 ) u a l : Minority group high productivity workers only get hired when the interview is conclusive. So,
where
Minority group low productivity workers never get hired so
Then, if u g = u g h + u g l ; for g = a; i and u = u a + u i ; we have
Existence and dynamic stability of steady state equilibria
A characterization of the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium is a list f ; a ;
i ; g such that the market tightness, ; solves equation (5) where a ; i and come from population ‡ows as described in Section 3.4 and …rms hire majority group workers whose interview is inconclusive (i.e. a V h c) while they do not hire minority group workers whose interview is inconclusive (i.e. i V h < c).
While the dynamic response of the population ‡ows to policy changes will be provided in the simulations below, the analysis here will focus on steady states. In steady state the population variables are constant over Disadvantaged equilibrium exists. What should be clear, though, is that for any k below the smallest of those values fork; all 4 steady state equilibria will exist. When all 4 equilibrium types do exist, the choice of which group is disadvantaged is arbitrary. The presumption here is that for historical reasons (e.g. government sanctioned, or taste-based discrimination), one group has su¤ered worse labor market outcomes than the rest of the population. Ultimately, when we look at the data, the issue is moot. In the case of the US it is the Black, smaller, population that experiences the higher unemployment rate and that guides the selection of equilibrium for policy analysis.
Generically, the conditions on populations required to sustain equilibria of any type will be satis…ed with strict inequalities. Thus for the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium a V h > c and i V h < c: This means that a deviation by a positive measure of …rms away from equilibrium behavior even for a strictly positive amount of time will not necessarily a¤ect populations enough to set the economy moving toward a di¤erent steady state. 11 As a consequence, the Minority Disadvantaged, Majority Disadvantaged, Lenient and Strict equilibria (when they exist) are dynamically stable. As equilibria in these kinds of model generically come in odd numbers, there will in fact be mixed strategy symmetric steady state equilibria in which …rms are indi¤er-ent between hiring and not hiring workers of one or both groups when their interview is inconclusive. In those steady states, any deviation by a positive measure of …rms will immediately set the workforce on a path away from the precise composition required to sustain the …rms'indi¤erence. Such steady state equilibria will be dynamically unstable.
Simulations
This paper represents an attempt to understand how outcomes can di¤er so greatly across racial groups even after controlling for skills. Consistent with Holzer and LaLonde [2000] and Bowlus and Seitz [2000] , all of the action in the model is in hiring. Still, it is not clear from the preceding analysis that the composition e¤ects identi…ed here are of any quantitative signi…cance.
For example, Hornstein et al [2011] show that while the sequential search model is capable of supporting wage dispersion, they also show that under realistic parameters the extent of that dispersion is small relative to that found in the data. Here, I demonstrate that the model is capable of generating the kinds of outcomes observed in real labor markets. Speci…cally the model will be calibrated to the market for black and white high school drop-outs in the USA. The implied parameter values will then be used to address the potential e¢ cacy of policy initiatives. average monthly unemployment for whites, 6.9%; average monthly unemployment for blacks, 13.4%.
Functional forms and parameters
Welfare
As everyone in the economy is risk neutral, welfare, W; amounts to aggregate bene…ts minus aggregate costs. So, 
As who gets hired depends on the …rms' hiring strategies, hiring costs are contingent on those strategies. Table 2 contains the ‡ow hiring costs for each of the strategies considered. 13 Table 2 : Flow hiring costs
Strategy Flow hiring cost
The resulting value of welfare can be compared to the benchmark value associated with no job creation at all, W = b= ; and the constrained e¢ cient level of steady state welfare, W P : Using the calibrated parameters, W = 19:12 and W P = 19:52. Table 3 presents the outcomes for various economies based on the calibrated parameters of Table 1 . "Disc" is the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium.
Results
"Lenient" is the equilibrium in which everyone is treated like an advantaged group member. At these parameter values neither the Strict nor the Majority Disadvantaged steady state equilibrium exists. That is, at the workforce composition implied by either of these steady states, …rms would accept all workers with inconclusive interviews. In the language of Proposition 1, the calibrated value of k is larger than the value ofk associated with the existence of either of those equilibria.
The result is more general than speci…c parameters used here though and speaks to why we typically see the numerically smaller ethnic group being disadvantaged. When the larger group are disadvantaged, discriminatory hiring has a stronger impact on vacancy creation. Unemployment is higher so that employers …nd applicants faster which tends to make them pickier.
But, if the workers to whom they are lenient are su¢ ciently rare, …rms are more inclined to accept workers with inconclusive interviews.
The column headed " = 1" refers to a perfect interviewing economyeveryone's true productivity is obvious when they apply for the job. The column headed " = 0" refers to an economy in which there are no interviews. Table 3 : Results
The rows of Table 3 refer to the main outcomes of interest. Recall that is the share of the majority group workers in the unemployment pool. It should be compared with the share of majority workers in the population, = 0:85: Then g is the share of high productivity workers in the unemployment pool of group g = a; i: These should be compared with the share of high productivity workers in the population, = 0:905: The aggregate, majority and minority unemployment rates are self-explanatory.
Finally, (W W )=(W P W ) is the extent to which the current equilibrium allocation provides an improvement in welfare above the benchmark of no job creation.
In the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium, the racial composition of unemployment does not look a lot di¤erent from the population at large.
About a quarter of the unemployed are minority workers compared to about one sixth of the general population. But only 52.7% of the white unemployed and 29.2% of the black unemployed are high productivity compared to 90.5%
in the general population. This re ‡ects the importance of interviewing in shaping the composition of the workforce.
As long as policy can be used to eliminate discrimination (see Section 4.4), the model predicts that the economy will eventually move to the Lenient equilibrium. The outcomes associated with that equilibrium are included to demonstrate the possible bene…ts that emerge from policy action.
Speci…cally, the model predicts that in the long-run welfare would be higher and unemployment would be lower for everyone with the elimination of discrimination.
The columns of Table 3 this should be obvious as there are no applicants for whom the interview is inconclusive. In the case of = 0; discrimination cannot occur because there is no basis for the composition e¤ects that cause the discriminatory behavior in the …rst place.
Anti-discriminatory policy
An obvious question here is what could a¢ rmative action achieve in this economy? In the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium, both racial groups earn the same wages but minority workers are hired at a lower rate. Ideally, antidiscrimination policy will entail having …rms interview in a way that the employer cannot detect the applicant's group membership (color-blind hiring). Their propensity to hire members of either group will now depend on the proportion, ; of high productivity workers in the combined population of the unemployed. Thus
If V h > c …rms will hire everyone one whose interview is inconclusive leading eventually to the Lenient steady state equilibrium. If V h < c …rms will hire no one whose interview is inconclusive leading to the Strict steady state equilibrium. At the calibrated parameter values, however, we know that the Strict equilibrium does not exist so that color-blind hiring will work to move the economy to the Lenient equilibrium with the concomitant long run A concern here, though, is that when the policy is …rst brought in, …rms are being forced to hire in a way that is not in their immediate interest.
Vacancy creation will fall initially leading to higher unemployment among whites in the short term. Figure 1 plots the value of u g =P g ; g = i; a over the transition following enactment of color-blind hiring. The short term increase in white unemployment is barely perceptible. It rises by less than one hundredth of a percentage point and returns to its pre-policy value within 6 weeks. Convergence to the long run level of unemployment takes around 27 months.
The present discounted value of welfare over the transition converted to the measure used in Table 3 is 10.98%.
But, how practical is color-blind hiring? Goldin and Rouse [2000] looked at the practice of orchestral auditions held behind a screen. They …nd that it increased the success rate of women by 50%. Coate and Loury [1993] on the other hand, argue that such "process" control is not feasible in the general labor market and suggest that policy analysis should focus on "outcome"
control. In the context of the current model this would mean that …rms should be required to hire black workers at the same rate as white workers.
Under the above parameterization this would mean …rms initially having to hire blacks that were known to be low productivity. This would cause a more severe drop in vacancy creation and a sharper increase in white unemployment than occurs under color-blind hiring. To the extent, however, that outcome control is more feasible it would equally be possible to enforce the outcomes associated with color-blind hiring and allow …rms to decide who to take under that constraint.
Extensions
Costly interviews
In reality, assessing the ability of applicants is costly. Thus far the paper has abstracted from this cost and consequently avoided the extent to which the interview is a choice of the …rm. Let represent the cost of interviewing the worker. Clearly, for large enough, no …rms will interview anyone and the outcome would be the same as with = 0: Table 3 indicates that as a policy initiative, punitively expensive interviewing would, at least in the long run, be Pareto improving. Despite this, in all of the equilibria discussed above, the private return to interviewing for …rms is strictly positive. This means that there is a positive value of small enough that its introduction will not change anything. So, under the parameters adopted here, the return to interviewing is higher when everyone else does it than when no one does. For values of between these …gures no one will interview as long as nobody else does -ignorance is privately optimal. But if everyone else interviews, then I will have to interview too. Now with = 0:85; the value to interviewing everyone in the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium is 49.2% of c: But, it di¤ers by race. Being able to interview whites is worth 43.5% while being able to interview blacks is worth 65.7%. A cost of interviewing between these values would lead, in the short run, to a discriminatory interviewing process. In the long run though, as whites would all be getting hired, this would bring down the value to interviewing for both races. As long as the return to interviewing minority workers continues to exceed that of interviewing majority workers it can be in a …rm's interest to implement a discriminatory interview policy.
Interview technology investment
Here I suppose instead, that individual interviews are costless but that …rms must invest ex ante in their interview technology. The cost of the initial job creation would be f ( ) where f 0 > 0; f 00 > 0; f (0) = f 0 (0) = 0 and lim !1 f ( ) = 1: Again the propensity to invest in this way will depend on the value to interviewing which depends in turn on the propensity for others to invest. From the foregoing it should be clear that = 0 will not be an equilibrium. It is privately in every …rm's interest to acquire the technology even though they would all be better o¤ without it. What this means is that there will be overinvestment in interviewing. As individual interviews are costless …rms would never be inclined to follow a discriminatory interview policy. Whether the technology will sustain discriminatory hiring would depend on parameters.
Conclusion
This paper provides a simple model of statistical discrimination based on composition e¤ects. Imperfect interviewing means that hiring …rms make mistakes. If they hire all workers for whom the interview is inconclusive they end up hiring some low quality workers. Consequently, there are relatively few low quality workers in the unemployment pool that can then justify hiring the workers with the inconclusive interviews. If …rms do not hire any workers for whom the interview is inconclusive, it leaves all of the low quality workers in the unemployment pool. The implied composition can then justify the unwillingness to hire the workers with inconclusive interviews.
These outcomes can be supported as multiple equilibria in a model without racial groups. The model with racial groups can then be used to understand why one racial group might experience high unemployment while operating in the same labor market as another racial group that has low unemployment. The idea is that …rms identify individuals as being a member of a racial group for whom the unemployment pool has a known composition. If the quality of the worker's unemployment pool is high, the worker is hired.
If it is low, the worker is rejected.
A major point of this paper is that these composition e¤ects are not merely a theoretical possibility but that they can plausibly cause the kinds of di¤erences in outcomes that we observe in real labor markets. For this reason, the model was calibrated to the US labor market for high school dropouts and shown to be consistent with the observed di¤erences in unemployment between whites and blacks. In the model, as in the data, whites and blacks are equally likely to loose their jobs -all of the action is in hiring.
Corrective policy here is mandatory color-blind hiring. The predicted transition path shows that concerns as to the impact of this policy on white unemployment are unfounded. Aggregate welfare gains are small but positive. 
It is immediate that rhs of (15) is negatively sloped in and from the properties of the matching function it limits to in…nity as approaches 0 and limits to 0 as approaches in…nity. There is always a unique value of that solves (15).
Now consider the Strict nondiscriminatory outcome in which only those known to be of type h are hired. This is equivalent to everyone being treated like a minority group worker in the Minority Disadvantaged equilibrium. With = 0; = 0 too and
There is, clearly, always a unique value of that solves (16).
Now consider the general case of solving equation (5), a and i are given by (12) and (13) Then lim !0 = (there is no matching so the unemployment pool looks like the entry ‡ow) and lim !1 = 0 (instantaneous matching means all majority workers are employed all of the time). We know that remains …nite for all and that it is strictly positive for = 0: This means that rhs of (5) limits to in…nity as approaches 0 and limits to 0 as approaches in…nity. the second inequality will hold as long as is large enough. As rhs of (5) limits to 0 as approaches in…nity, for anyk there exits some^ such that for values of
Step 3: Existence of Minority Disadvantaged Equilibrium
